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DOBBS V. JACKSON
WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION
*This paper was written during the spring before the U.S. Supreme Court
released its decision on the Dobbs case on June 24, 2022.

By Elena Gutbrod
On December 1, 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral
arguments in the matter Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization
to determine whether the current framework for abortion restrictions will
remain in place.1 Perhaps one of the most divisive2 social issues the past
century, Dobbs surrounds a Mississippi law prohibiting abortions after 15
weeks’ gestational age with limited exceptions.3 The Mississippi law requires
the physician to determine the fetus’s probable gestational age, 4 and, unless
there is a medical emergency or a “severe fetal abnormality,”5 no physician
may perform an abortion if the gestational age is greater than 15 weeks.6
The Mississippi law, if upheld, will overturn
the current framework provided by Roe
v. Wade7 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.
Roe and Casey,8 as discussed infra in
Part II delineate guidelines by which states
must abide in restrictions, prohibitions or
regulations on abortions.9 If the Supreme
Court overturns Roe and Casey, the ruling
would grant states more authority to pass
more restrictive abortion legislation by
repealing the “viability line.”10

The road to Dobbs is paved by
stare decisis

In 1973, the Supreme Court heard and
decided Roe v. Wade, the case which
overturned a Texas ordinance making it
illegal to procure an abortion except upon
medical advice for saving the life of the
mother.11 In overturning the ordinance, the
Supreme Court held the ordinance violated
the 14th Amendment right to privacy and
set forth the “trimester framework.”12
The “trimester framework” provided that
through the end of the first trimester, the
state must leave the decision to have an
abortion to the woman and her physician.13
During the first trimester, however, the state
could regulate abortions if the regulation
was “reasonably related to maternal
health.”14 From viability forward, the state
could regulate and even ban abortions.15 In
Roe, the Court also discussed extensively
whether a fetus was a person for purposes
of the 14th Amendment.16 The Court

determined the State’s interest in potential
life reaches a “compelling point” at viability17
of the fetus.18 Therein the Supreme Court
established the viability line.
Twenty years later in 1992, the Court decided
Casey which concerned amendments to
Pennsylvania abortion legislation.19 The
Pennsylvania amendments required a
woman seeking an abortion to satisfy certain
procedural requirements: the woman must
be provided certain information 24 hours
prior to the abortion; informed parental
consent for a minor; and signed notification
to the husbands of married women.20 The
Court reaffirmed Roe’s essential holding
recognizing a woman’s right to choose
to have an abortion before fetal viability
and without “undue interference from the
State.”21 The holding further recognized the
State’s power to restrict abortions after
viability with the caveat that the law contain
exceptions for pregnancies endangering the
woman’s life.22 The Court reemphasized the
States’ legitimate interests in protecting the
health of the woman and the potential life of
the fetus.23
In the Casey opinion, the Court extensively
discussed stare decisis—the doctrine of
the obligation to follow prior precedent.24 In
examining a potential overturning of prior
precedent, the Court considers the following:
whether the rule has proven intolerable in
practical workability; whether the rule has
continued on next page >
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been subject to reliance which would work
special hardship in overruling; whether
related principles of law have developed to
leave the old rule as a remnant; and whether
the facts have changed so significantly
to render the old rule void of significant
application or justification.25
In analyzing these four considerations,
the Court determined the Roe holding was
not unworkable as it provides a “simple
limitation beyond which a state law is
enforceable.”26 The Court found women had
relied significantly upon Roe to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the
nation.27 The Supreme Court failed to find
a development of constitutional law during
the prior twenty years which rendered
Roe obsolete.28 Lastly, the Court found the
factual assumptions surrounding Roe—
medical advances in maternal and neonatal
healthcare—had no bearing on the holding
(viability marks the earliest point where the
State’s interest is adequate to impose a ban
on abortions).29 The Casey Court ultimately
determined the precedential inquiry of Roe
remained unweakened in the prior 20 years
notwithstanding that “it ha[d] engendered
disapproval.”30
Since Casey, numerous petitioners and
state legislatures have sought to overturn
Roe.31 But for nearly 50 years, the Roe
viability line and the Casey undue burden
standard remain unbroken in Supreme Court
precedent.

Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs

The Dobbs case was filed on March 19, 2018,
when Mississippi passed the Gestational
Age Act which, sought to prohibit abortions
beyond 15 weeks’ gestation with certain
exceptions.32
Mississippi asserts the Constitution
contains no right to abortion, nor limit to
the states’ rights to restrict abortion and
advocates for overturning Roe and Casey
because the factors of stare decisis are
in contravention with the original rules of
Roe and Casey.33 In the alternative, or at a
minimum, Mississippi argues the viability
line must be abandoned in favor of a
rational basis review when it comes to
pre-viability restrictions on abortions.34
Jackson Women’s Health Organization
(“Women’s Health”) counters that there is
no justification for overruling Roe and Casey,

and the viability line is firmly grounded in
the Constitution.35 Women’s Health argues
Mississippi presents no alternative to the
viability line which would retain a stable
right to abortion.36

Is a right to abortion rooted in
the Constitution even though the
Constitution is silent on the issue?

Mississippi asserts that the Constitution
permits restrictions on elective abortions
if a rational basis supports doing so.37 The
text of the Constitution never mentions
abortion and the “right to abortion is not a
‘liberty’ that enjoys substantive protection
under the Due Process Clause.”38 Moreover,
Mississippi asserts that the right to abortion
is not deeply rooted in the nation’s history
and tradition. Mississippi points to the 27
states that had prohibited abortion in 1868
and proffers that, “The public would have
understood that, consistent with the 14th
Amendment, States could restrict abortion
to pursue legitimate interests and could
do so throughout pregnancy.”39 Mississippi
also argues Obergefell40 has no relevance on
the topic: Obergefell addressed “who may
exercise” the right and not whether the right
exists at all.41 Lastly, Mississippi asserts
abortion restrictions must only be rationally
related to legitimate government interests,
“[b]ecause nothing in text, structure, history
or tradition makes abortion a fundamental
right or denies States the power to
restrict.”42
Although the Constitution does not explicitly
mention abortion, Women’s Health asserts
that the right to abortion is, “grounded in
the 14th Amendment’s protection against
deprivation of a person’s liberty without due
process of law.”43 Women’s Health believes
the Constitution implicates women’s liberty
interests, including “the right to make
family decisions and the right to physical
autonomy.”44 Respondents cite extensive
Supreme Court jurisprudence in support of
the contention that physical autonomy and
bodily integrity are “integral components
of liberty.”45 Women’s Health contends
the right to end a pregnancy logically and
directly follows from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence that recognizes bodily
integrity, the family, intimate relations and
whether or not to bear a child.46 Women’s
Health argues that allowing states to
control this intimate decision “would
result in a radical displacement of personal
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liberty[.]”47 Moreover, Women’s Health
argues, Casey struck the balance between
state interests and bodily integrity through
the viability line.48 Women’s Health contends
the viability line is the point where the state
interest becomes strong enough to justify a
legislative ban.49
The two sides of the argument are in such
tension, the decision may come down
to whether or not stare decisis requires
affirming Roe and Casey. The briefs side
by side find almost no common ground.
However, when placed side by side, Jackson
Women’s Health Organization sheds light
on the holes in Mississippi’s arguments.
Namely, Women’s Health argues that the
right to privacy and bodily autonomy is
grounded in the 14th Amendment, there
has been no substantial change since Casey
to justify overturning the precedent and
that without the viability line, no feasible
alternative exists.

Does stare decisis require affirming
Roe and Casey?

Mississippi unequivocally believes all four
stare decisis elements support overruling
Roe and Casey. The State asserts “[t]his
Court’s Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously
Wrong.”50 Petitioners assert Roe and Casey
are “hopelessly unworkable[,]” they have
“inflicted profound damage[,]” progress
has “overtaken them[,]” and lastly, their
holdings find no relief in reliance interests.51
In support of the contention that the
cases are wrong, Mississippi points to
the Constitution’s lack of a “general right
of privacy” or specific right to abortion.
Mississippi alleges that using Casey to
determine whether or not a restriction is
an “undue burden” makes the standard
unworkable, and does not promote
administrability, clarity or predictability.52
Rather, the State contends, the only
workable part of Casey is that it required
striking nearly any pre-viability state
abortion law.53 Interestingly, Mississippi
cites severe damage as a result of the
current framework, because the Roe
framework blocks states from “fully
protecting unborn life, women’s health and
their professions.”54 The legal and factual
underpinnings of Roe and Casey, the State
argues, are eroded.55 Legally, the right
to abortion is not rooted by history and
tradition. Factually, advances in childcare
assistance, maternity leave and laws

addressing pregnancy discrimination permit women to pursue
career success and a rich family life.56 In support of the contention
that reliance on stare decisis does not support reaffirming
Roe, Mississippi points to the “fractured, unsettled [abortion]
jurisprudence” and that for 50 years since Roe, abortion was a
“wholly unsettled policy issue.”57 In conclusion, Mississippi states
Roe and Casey do more damage to stare decisis than the cases
advance it.58
In response, Women’s Health contends the four factors of stare
decisis support affirming Roe and Casey. The organization asserts
that federal courts have uniformly applied the viability line.59 It also
disregards the State’s argument of the undue burden standard as
irrelevant because the Dobbs case surrounds a ban, not a regulation.60
Women’s Health underscores that every factual argument raised by
Mississippi has been presented to and rejected by the Court—stating
there exists no significant and unaddressed factual change in the
instant matter to justify overruling.61 Rather, Women’s Health alleges
abortions have gotten safer and childbirth has grown comparatively
more dangerous, swaying any argument for women’s health in favor
of Roe and Casey.62 So, too, Women’s Health disregards the argument
of fetal pain as that has already been presented and rejected by the
Supreme Court.63 Women’s Health asserts no policy change could ever
dull the concerns that surround when, if and how many children to
have.64 Rejecting the argument that contraceptives are more effective
and widespread now, Women’s Health responds that access is not
universal nor affordable, particularly for young people.65
Women’s Health further argues that the continued choice to decide
whether to continue a pregnancy remains absolutely integral to
women’s equal participation in society.66 Women’s Health then
argues the lack of access to abortion or more stringent abortion
restrictions disproportionately affects women of color, women of
lower socioeconomic status and women in low-income housing.67
Lastly, Jackson Women’s Health Organization argues that
Mississippi failed to provide a reasonable alternative.68 Women’s
Health contends that Mississippi’s suggestion of “any scrutiny”
destroys any uniformity among the federal courts and provides no
guidance to analyze an abortion law on a case-by-case basis.69

PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF DOBBS
The District Court of Mississippi struck the Gestational Age
Act because the Act is a facially unconstitutional ban
on pre-viability abortions

The same day Mississippi passed the Gestational Age Act,70 Jackson
Women’s Health Organization sought an emergency temporary
restraining order (“TRO”).71 The Southern District Court of Mississippi
granted the TRO.72 The district court granted Women’s Health’s
summary judgment motion on November 20, 2018.73 The court
answered the narrow question of “whether the 15-week mark is
before or after viability[,]”74 with “no” because viability typically
begins at 23 or 24 weeks.75 Mississippi argued the law was a
“regulation” which should only be subject to the restriction that it
does not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose.76
While the State was correct that regulations on abortions must

only pass the “undue burden” standard delineated in Casey, the
district court determined the law was a ban, “forbidding certain
women from choosing pre-viability abortions rather than specifying
the conditions under which such abortions are to be allowed.”77
Mississippi alternatively requested the court disregard the Roe and
Casey precedent and instead look to “fetal pain” instead of viability.78
In no uncertain terms, the court rejected this, stating, “[n]o, the real
reason we are here is simple. The State chose to pass a law it knew
was unconstitutional to endorse a decades-long campaign, fueled by
national interest groups, to ask the Supreme Court to overturn Roe
v. Wade.”79
Relying on Roe and Casey as controlling law, the district court
determined, “Courts across the country are required to follow
Casey’s holding that, ‘viability marks the earliest point at which the
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontherapeutic80 abortions.’”81

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court,
finding the Act directly conflicts with Casey

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the State raised one substantive
argument and two procedural arguments:82 whether the summary
judgment standard properly applied Supreme Court abortion
precedent, whether limiting discovery to viability was an abuse of
discretion and whether injunctive relief was proper.83
As to the first issue, the Fifth Circuit found in light of Casey’s holding
“no state interest can justify a pre-viability ban.”84 In determining
the law was a ban and not a regulation, the court stated,

The Act pegs the availability of abortions to a specific
gestational age that undisputedly prevents the
abortions of some non-viable fetuses. It is a prohibition
on pre-viability abortion. Gonzales is distinguishable
for the same reason that any case considering a
pre-viability regulation is distinguishable: laws that
limit certain methods of abortion or impose certain
requirements on those seeking abortions are distinct
under Casey from those that prevent women from
choosing to have abortions before viability.85
The court unequivocally stated that Casey does not tolerate bans
on pre-viability abortions because the Supreme Court’s viability
framework has already balanced the State’s asserted interests and
beliefs. “Until viability, it is for the woman, not the state, to weigh
any risks to maternal health and to consider personal values and
beliefs in deciding whether to have an abortion.”86 The court found
that no issue existed as to whether the law was a regulation or a
ban, and because pre-viability bans are not tolerated by Casey, the
district court properly awarded summary judgment.
Of note in the Fifth Circuit opinion was the scathing concurrence
of Circuit Judge James C. Ho, wherein he chastised the district
court’s handling of the case.87 Judge Ho believed the district court,
“display[ed] an alarming disrespect for the millions of Americans
continued on next page >
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who believe that babies deserve legal
protection during pregnancy as well as after
birth, and that abortion is the immoral,
tragic and violent taking of innocent human
life.” Finding the district court opinion gave
unequal consideration of both sides of the
debate, Judge Ho asserted, “the district
court opinion disparages the Mississippi
legislature as ‘pure-gaslighting.’ It equates
belief in the sanctity of life with sexism,88
disregarding the millions of women
who strongly oppose abortion.”89 Judge
Ho, although “duty bound to affirm the
judgment of the district court[,]” concurred,
nevertheless providing the opposing side
of the argument: “Nothing in the text or the
original understanding of the Constitution
establishes a right to an abortion.”90
Judge Ho certainly provided the moral
argument against abortion. However, the
issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether
the Mississippi ban was legal—not whether
it was moral or ethical. In presenting the
non-legal argument, the author believes
Judge Ho simply fueled the already raging
fire surrounding abortion by using such
inflammatory language such as “immoral,
tragic and violent” and “offensive” in regard
to abortion, while ultimately agreeing that
the supreme law of the land nonetheless
required affirming the district court’s
decision.

“Will this institution survive the
stench that this creates in the public
perception—that the Constitution and
its reading are just political acts?”91

The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on May 17, 202192 and held oral
arguments on December 1, 2021. Certiorari
was limited to the question of “whether
all pre-viability prohibitions on elective
abortions are unconstitutional.”93 The
ramifications of answering this question are
perhaps wider than the question explicitly
contemplates. If the Court upholds the 15week ban, they will effectively overturn Roe
and Casey and abandon the viability line,
which will open an avenue for other states
to implement similar or more restrictive
limitations on abortion access. If the Court
strikes the Mississippi law, the current
framework will continue along the viability
line wherein states may restrict abortions
past viability or regulate abortions previability provided the regulations do not

work an undue burden upon the woman
seeking an abortion.94

The continued accessibility of abortion
unfortunately may hinge on the
composition of the Court

Unfortunately, it may not matter who has
the better argument in this battle—prolife or pro-choice advocates. As the Bench
exists now, six of the nine justices are
conservative and at the oral arguments,
the majority of the six seemed poised
to overturn Roe.95 Justice Sotomayor,
addressing this very question, asked, “Will
this institution survive the stench that this
creates in the public perception—that the
Constitution and its reading are just political
acts? I don’t see how it is possible.”96 At
oral arguments, Justice Kavanaugh agreed
that the Constitution does not directly
address abortion and should be left to the
democratic process.97 Instead, he asserts
the Court should remain “scrupulously
neutral.”98 The author believes this may be
the most detrimental potential outcome of
the Supreme Court decision—if the matter
were wholly left to the states, 20 states
have “trigger laws” which will automatically
ban or severely restrict abortion in the first
and second trimesters the instant Roe is
overturned.99
Alito similarly seemed inclined to overrule
Roe when he asked whether Roe could
be overruled regardless of whether
something has changed if it was found
to be “egregiously wrong.”100 Chief Justice
Roberts suggested the 15-week ban would
be enough time to decide whether to have
an abortion.101 Justice Barrett questioned
the speaker for the Respondents about
“safe haven laws,” wherein a parent
can anonymously give her child up for
adoption.102 This question lacks relevance
because it ignores the fact that carrying
a fetus to full term and giving birth is 14
times more dangerous than having an
abortion—not even mentioning the fact that
safe haven laws have no bearing on whether
abortion is a protected right. Justice Gorsuch
asked the Respondent representative to
address the argument of unworkability
of the “undue burden” prior to viability.103
The undue burden standard is irrelevant to
this matter because the law at bar was a
prohibition, not a regulation subject to the
undue burden standard.
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Either way the Court decides, it is likely the
hotly disputed debate will continue for years
to come. The two sides of the debate are so
polarized it is almost guaranteed both sides
will not be satisfied with whatever decision
the Court makes. Unfortunately, the matter
will be held in limbo until some point in the
summer when the Court is anticipated to
make its decision.
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